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But if thought corrupts language, language can also cor-
rupt thought.
-George Orwell
INTRODUCTION
Racial issues can be contentious, but they can be made even more
so when the terms used in discussions of racial phenomena are ambigu-
ous. Because words can and do have multiple meanings in everyday
usage, one goal of this paper is to suggest operational definitions of
terms such as "discrimination," "preferences," and "prejudice," so that
one phenomenon is not confused with another. Part I of this paper will
attempt to give these terms operational definitions and discuss how these
definitions might help us to analyze various racial phenomena that are
otherwise routinely viewed as racism. Part II examines whether certain
behaviors that are often described as racism are correctly characterized as
such. Part III outlines the ways in which various legal scholars have
t John M. Olin Distinguished Professor of Economics, George Mason University.
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approached the canonical idea of anti-discrimination in the United States
within the contexts of freedom of association and racial segregation. Part
IV explores the issue of government-subsidized preference indulgence,
particularly in regard to minimum wage laws.
I. LANGUAGE AND RACE
Do people have a right to discriminate? This question can be ap-
proached in at least two ways: (a) what is the legal answer and (b) what
might be the moral answer? The distinction is important because acts
that are legal might not be moral and, conversely, those that are moral
might not be legal. South Africa's apartheid was both legal and constitu-
tional, yet morally repugnant. During the era of slavery in the United
States, assisting a runaway slave was moral, but it was in violation of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.' To approach the question of whether peo-
ple have, or should have, a right to discriminate, we might begin by at-
tempting to give the term discrimination operational meaning to avoid
confusing different forms of behavior.
One legal dictionary defines discrimination as:
unequal treatment of persons, for a reason which has
nothing to do with legal rights or ability. Federal and
state laws prohibit discrimination in employment, availa-
bility of housing, rates of pay, right to promotion, educa-
tional opportunity, civil rights, and use of facilities based
on race, nationality, creed, color, age, sex or sexual
orientation. 2
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination defines racial discrimination as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference
made on a particular basis, such as race, sex, religion,
national origin, marital status, pregnancy, or disability,
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impair-
ing the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise, on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural, or any other
field of life.3
I Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, repealed by Act of June 28, 1864, ch.
166, 13 Stat. 200.
2 THE REAL LiFE DICTIONARY OF THE LAW, at http://dictionary.law.com (last visited
Sept. 13, 2003).
3 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
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Australia's Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 defines racial dis-
crimination as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based
on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impair-
ing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field
of public life.4
Finally, a United Nations Convention Against Discrimination in Ed-
ucation defined discrimination as follows: "The term 'discrimination' in-
cludes any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference which, being
based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, economic condition or birth, has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment."
5
While these definitions of discrimination might be useful, they fail
to be operationally useful in that they mix several kinds of behavior,
which leads to confusion. Increased understanding can be achieved if we
simplify the definition such that one act is not confused with another.
A. DISCRIMINATION
More generally, and inclusive of legal attempts to define the term,
discrimination might be operationally defined as the act of choice or se-
lection. All selection necessarily and simultaneously requires non-selec-
tion. In other words, choice requires discrimination. When one chooses
to attend the University of Chicago, he non-selects Harvard University as
well as every other university. When one selects a Bordeaux wine, he
non-selects a Burgundy wine. These choices could be characterized as
university discrimination and wine discrimination. Similarly, when the
term discrimination is modified with the nouns "race" and "sex," we
merely specify the criterion upon which the choice is made; instead of
university and wine discrimination, it is race and sex discrimination.
One might ask if there is any conceptual distinction between dis-
criminating for or against particular universities, wines, and other goods
and services, and discriminating for or against particular races and sexes.
Should one discriminate at all? Is it possible for one to make a case for
indifference or random choice among objects of desire?
4 Racial Discrimination Act, 1975 (Austl.), available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/
html/pasteact/0/47/0/PA000170.htm (last visited July 25, 2003).
5 Vernon Van Dyke, Human Rights Without Discrimination, 67 AM. POL. Scl. REV.
1267, 1273 (1973) (quoting the Convention Against Discrimination in Education (1960) spon-
sored by UNESCO).
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In practice, indifference and random choice are hardly ever the case.
Our lives are largely spent discriminating in favor of or against selected
activities, objects, and people. Some of us discriminate against those
who have criminal records, those who bathe infrequently, those who use
vulgar speech, or those who have improper social graces. Most of us
choose mates within our own racial, ethnic or religious group, thus dis-
criminating against mates who, save for their race, ethnicity, or religion,
might be just as suitable. According to the 1992 census, only 2.2 percent
of Americans were married to someone outside their own race.6 There is
also evidence of discrimination based on physical characteristics in polit-
ics; not many short men have been elected president of the United States.
In fact, twenty-three out of forty-three presidents have been 5'11" or
taller, well above the population's average height. 7 This is not an ex-
pected random outcome. Furthermore, discrimination is not consistent.
Sometimes people discriminate against theater entertainment in favor of
parties, or against women in favor of men, and, at other times and under
different circumstances, the same people discriminate in the reverse
manner.
One might be tempted to argue that racial discrimination in mar-
riage does not have important social consequences, and, therefore, unlike
other forms of racial discrimination, it is not in need of a legal or politi-
cal remedy. However, this form of racial discrimination does have sig-
nificant social effects. When there is assortive (non-random) mate
selection, it heightens whatever group differences exist in the popula-
tion. 8 For instance, consider the result when individuals with high IQs
marry other individuals with high IQs, and when individuals earning
high incomes marry other individuals earning high incomes. To the ex-
tent there is a racial correlation between these characteristics, racial dis-
crimination in mate selection exaggerates the differences in the
population's intelligence and income distribution. There would be
greater income equality if high-IQ and high-income people mated with
low-IQ and low-income people. But most people probably would be
horrified by the suggestion of a mandate requiring this.9
6 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SER. P-20, No. 468,
MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1992, XI (1992).
7 See Camp Vishus.org, Presidents by Height, at http://www.campvishus.org/presrelht
AFF.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
8 Assortive or non-random selection of mating partners with respect to one or more
characteristics is positive when like people mate more frequently than would be expected by
chance and is negative when the reverse occurs.
9 See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Marriage: Part 1, 81 J. oF POL. EcON. 813, 827
(1973) (stating that it is far more common for similar people to mate than those who are unlike
each other).
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It would appear that the term "discrimination," defined simply as
the act of choice, is morally neutral in the sense that there are no unam-
biguous standards that permit us to argue that the choice to attend Uni-
versity of Chicago or the choice to purchase a Bordeaux wine is more
righteous than the choice to attend Harvard University or purchase a Bur-
gundy wine. And more importantly, no logical argument can be made to
permit the government to force a person to select one university or wine
over another. Moreover, one cannot produce a reasonable argument in
favor of forcing individuals to grant equal opportunity when choosing
universities or wines.
If people are free to discriminate in favor of, or against, a particular
university or wine, what argument can be made against people having
that same right with respect to choosing any other object of desire, in-
cluding the race or sexual characteristics of their mates, employees, te-
nants, or club members? If one shares the value of freedom of
association, why should some associations by choice be permitted and
others denied? If a man is not permitted to bring a court action against a
woman who, for any arbitrary reason she chooses, refuses to have a dat-
ing relationship or establish a marital contract with him, what is the case
for bringing court action for other similarly arbitrary refusals to deal with
another, such as in the contexts of employment, renting or selling a
house, or club membership?
Noble Laureate Kenneth Arrow has stated that "[t]here are many
modern varieties of liberalism, which draw the boundaries between so-
cial and individual action in different places, but all agree in rejecting
racial discrimination, by which is meant allowing racial identification to
have a place in an individual's life chances."'10 However, if "allowing
racial identification to have a place in an individual's life chances"
means refusal to deal with certain individuals for arbitrary reasons, what
policy recommendations emerge? Refusal to deal with particular indi-
viduals can occur in various contexts, including activities like marriage,
friendship, and invitations to social gatherings, all of which have the pos-
sibility of affecting one's "life chances." If refusal to deal with certain
people is permitted in one activity, for any arbitrary reason, what case
can be made for not permitting refusal to deal with certain people in
other activities? The practical answer to this question has more to do
with the threat of government violence against people who, in a prohib-
ited manner, refuse to deal with certain people, than with any kind of
internally consistent logic.
10 Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?, 12 J.
OF ECON. PERSP. 91, 91 (1998).
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B. PREFERENCES
In discussions on race, descriptive terms and phrases like discrimi-
natory "values" 1 and "discriminatory tastes"' 12 are used. Sometimes the
behavior in question is described as prejudice, defined as "an antipathy
based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization."' 3
For the most part, choices reflect preferences. In economic theory,
it is postulated that each individual has a set of preferences. He selects a
preferred set of objects of desire from his available alternatives. There
are no objective criteria by which one set of preferences can be judged as
"better" or "worse" than another set, because there are simply no com-
monly accepted standards for evaluation. In other words, it is impossible
to demonstrate that preferring Bordeaux wines is superior to preferring
Burgundy, or that a preference to attend the University of Chicago is
superior to a preference to attend Harvard University.
Preferences are generally accepted as given. The most that can be
objectively determined is whether, given an opportunity set, the individ-
ual is optimizing. Our reasoning about preferences suggests that it also
applies to preferences for human attributes such as race, sex, nationality,
religion, beauty, or any other attribute. From a strictly analytical view,
there is no conceptual distinction to be made between preferences for
race, nationality, and sex, and preferences for universities and wine.
One might assert that racial preferences are not comparable to other
kinds of preferences in terms of the consequences they have for society
and for individuals.1 4 The indulgence of racial preferences has specific
effects that the indulgence of preferences for certain wines do not have;
but are the preferences basically different? If so, how do they differ? A
widespread preference for Bordeaux wines "harms" Burgundy producers
by reducing the value of resources held in Burgundy production. If the
harmful consequences of preferences are generally thought of as reduc-
ing the value of some resources while increasing the value of others, then
preferences for human physical attributes have similar effects. One im-
portant, and by no means trivial, difference between preferences for cer-
tain racial attributes and those for wines is that the latter are not as
specialized as the former. If Burgundy producers see a widespread pref-
erence for Bordeaux wines, they might be able to convert their resources
II Id. at 92.
12 Id. at 95 (explaining that the "discriminatory tastes" of employees affect the labor
market).
13 GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 9 (1954).
14 See John J. Donahue III, Discrimination in Employment, in THE NEW PALGRAVE Dic-
TIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 617, 617 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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into Bordeaux production. Racial attributes are more specialized. That
is, people who are black generally cannot become white. ' 5
The fact that racial attributes are specialized and unchangeable (or
immutable, if using the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion's language) 16 does not place them in a class by themselves. Persons
with average and higher IQs are generally preferred to those with below-
average IQs; persons who are not physically disabled are preferred to
those who are; non-stutterers are preferred to stutterers; women with at-
tractive features are preferred to those who are unattractive. In each of
these cases, and many others, the less-preferred attribute is unchange-
able. In each case the less-preferred person might suffer a competitive
disadvantage in some arenas. An inevitable consequence of freedom of
choice in a free society and differences in individual tastes, abilities, and
traits is that some individuals will be advantaged while others will be
disadvantaged.
Human preferences, whether for physical attributes, such as race, or
for other objects of desire, such as food, childrearing practices, alcohol
consumption, addictive drugs, or entertainment can have a moral dimen-
sion. A moral consensus condemning preferences for certain forms of
entertainment, such as pornographic movies, might exist. A moral con-
sensus condemning certain race and sex preferences also might exist.
The fact that a consensus exists on what constitutes moral or immoral
preferences does not alter the fact that people do exhibit preferences, and
that there is no commonly agreed-upon standard by which we can objec-
tively decide whether one set of preferences is more moral or righteous
than another. Moreover, there is no objective standard or proof that neu-
tral or indifferent racial preferences should be held with respect to any
association, be it dating and marriage, or employment and renting. Pro-
fessor Larry Alexander disagrees, stating:
Where harmful social effects will ensue from bias, given
the numbers and group characteristics, there is probably
a case for legally prohibiting biased choices in certain
realms otherwise left to private choice, particularly the
economic realm. . . . There is therefore less reason to
believe there is a moral right to make biased choices
when they produce harmful consequences, even within a
15 However, one study estimated that, between 1930 and 1940, approximately 2,600 Ne-
groes became white-"passed into the white race"--each year. E. W. Eckard, How Many
Negroes Pass?, 52 Am. J. OF Soc. 498, 500 (1947).
16 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Facts About Race/Color Discrimi-
nation, at http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/fs-race.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2003).
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framework that meets the minimum standards of
justice. 17
Alexander concludes:
In short, in an otherwise just society, discriminatory
preferences are intrinsically morally wrong if premised
on error, moral or factual, about the dispreferred. Dis-
criminatory preferences are extrinsically morally wrong
if their social costs are large relative to the costs of elim-
inating or frustrating them. And if a discriminatory pref-
erence is morally wrong-and if there is no moral right
that protects its exercise-then there is a case for legally
prohibiting its exercise if the costs of legal prohibition
and enforcement are low relative to the social gains to be
achieved. 18
Another legal scholar, Charles R. Lawrence, carries the argument
against preference indulgence a step further, arguing that unfairness is
inherent in the legal requirement that litigants should bear the burden of
proving that the plaintiff intentionally discriminated against them. 19
Lawrence argues that individuals living in a racist society unconsciously
discriminate without even knowing it because of stereotypes and atti-
tudes that dwell deep in their psyches. 20
C. PREJUDICE
In much of the racial discrimination literature, prejudice is usually
described as suspicion, intolerance, or an irrational hatred of other races.
In other instances, prejudice is seen as oppression. In other words, as
one legal scholar suggested, "if racial prejudice, the subordination of
people of color, and White supremacy persist, they do so largely because
the legal system sanctions them. '2 1 Other times prejudice is seen as ra-
cial preferences. For instance, in his dissenting opinion in Fullilove v.
Klutznick,2 2 Justice Stevens wrote:
because [the] perception [that statutes giving special
preferences to certain people rest on the assumption that
those who receive preferences are less qualified in some
17 Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV 149, 163 (1992).
18 Id. at 219.
19 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
20 Id. at 329-36.
21 Khiara M. Bridges, Note, On the Commodification of the Black Female Body: The
Critical Implications of the Alienability of Fetal Tissue, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 123, 133 (2002).
22 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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respect based on their race] . . . can only exacerbate
rather than reduce racial prejudice, it will delay the time
when race will become a truly irrelevant, or at least in-
significant, factor." 23
These visions of prejudice expose analysts to the pitfalls of making
ambiguous statements and advancing faulty arguments. A useful opera-
tional definition of prejudice can be found by examining its Latin root,
praejudicium, meaning "an opinion or judgment formed.., without due
examination. '24 Thus, we might define prejudicial acts as decision-mak-
ing on the basis of incomplete information.
Making decisions based on incomplete information is often neces-
sary and is to be expected in a world of scarcity, uncertainty, complexity,
and costly information. Other common experiences in decision-making
include erroneous interpretation of information and inconsistent conclu-
sions-that is, it is common for different individuals to arrive at different
interpretations even when confronted with the same information. Fur-
thermore, individuals frequently reach different decisions on just what
constitutes the optimal quantity of information to gather prior to making
decisions.
Consider a simple, yet intuitively appealing, example of how deci-
sions might be made on the basis of incomplete information (and possi-
bly erroneous interpretation of evidence). Suppose a fully-grown tiger
suddenly appeared in a room. A reliable prediction is that most individu-
als would endeavor to leave the area with great dispatch. Such a re-
sponse to the tiger's presence is not likely to be based on detailed
information about the behavioral characteristics of that particular tiger.
The response is more likely to be based upon one's stock of information
held about tigers as a class. The individual prejudges; we might even say
he employs stereotypes. He is not likely to seek additional information
because he calculates that the expected cost of an additional unit of infor-
mation about that tiger, such as talking to or petting him, is likely to
exceed the expected benefit. He simply ascribes known or surmised
group characteristics to the individual tiger.
Most often when people use the words prejudice and stereotype,
they are pejorative judgments to refer to those whose chosen quantity of
information for decision-making is deemed insufficient by the observer.
However, what constitutes the optimal quantity of information collected
before decisions are made is subjectively determined by the individual's
calculation of his costs and benefits.
23 Id. at 545.
24 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UN-
ABRIDGED 1788 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1993).
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A significant factor in decision-making is the recognition that infor-
mation is not costless. To acquire an additional unit of information re-
quires a sacrifice of time, effort, or other resources. Thus, people seek to
economize on information cost. In doing so, people tend to substitute
less costly forms of information for more costly forms. Physical attrib-
utes are cheap to observe. If a particular physical attribute is perceived
as correlated with a more costly-to-observe attribute, then people might
use that physical attribute as an estimator or proxy for the more costly-to-
observe attribute. The cheaply-observed fact that an individual is short,
an amputee, black, or a woman provides what some people deem suffi-
cient information for decision-making or predicting the presence of some
other more costly-to-observe attribute. For example, if asked to identify
individuals with doctoral degrees in physics only by observing race and
sex, most people would assume that white or Asian males are more likely
to hold such degrees than are black males or women. Such behavior is
what decision theory expects where an unobservable attribute must be
estimated from an observable one.
Stereotyping and prejudging can be independent of preferences.
Observing a person's decision-making behavior permits us to say noth-
ing unambiguous about that person's personal preferences with regard to
race, sex, ethnicity, or nationality. A simple example can demonstrate
this. Imagine the reader is on a particular university campus and he is
given the opportunity to pick a five-person basketball team from a group
of twenty students. The group consists of five black males, five white
males, five black females, and five white females. The reader has zero
information about the students' basketball proficiency and they are other-
wise indistinguishable except by race and sex. That is, they are identical
in terms of other physical characteristics: weight, height, etc. The reader
is told that if his selected team wins the basketball game, he will win a
$10,000 prize. Assuming that the reader's objective is to maximize his
winnings, he would probably be more likely to select black males for the
team.
What can an observer, watching that person's choices, say about his
race or sex preferences? There is absolutely nothing unambiguous that
can be said about the person's racial or sex preferences simply by ob-
serving choices based on race and sex. Moreover, a person having antip-
athy against blacks would select in the identical fashion provided that
maximizing winnings dominated his objective. Furthermore, given the
high correlation between race, sex, and basketball proficiency, would an-
yone care if a racial preference for white males were indulged by the
chooser? He would personally bear the cost of preference indulgence.
Physical characteristics can be used as proxies for other costly-to-
observe characteristics. Some racial and ethnic groups have higher inci-
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dence of, and mortality from, various diseases than the national average.
In 1998, mortality rates for cardiovascular diseases were approximately
30 percent higher among black adults than among white adults. 25 Cervi-
cal cancer rates were almost five times higher among Vietnamese women
in the U.S. than among white women.26 The Pima Indians of Arizona
have the highest known diabetes rates in the world. 27 Prostate cancer is
nearly twice as common among black men as white men.28
Whether genetics, environment, or some other factor accounts for
the association between race and certain diseases, it is undeniable that
such an association exists. This means that a physical characteristic like
race can be used as a proxy for the probability of the existence of some
other characteristic, such as prostate cancer or cervical cancer. In this
case, the reliance on proxies in decision-making is used for beneficial
purposes, as the potential correlation between physical characteristics
and race that permits health providers to better assess patient screening
needs.
II. EXAMINING BEHAVIORS FREQUENTLY
CHARACTERIZED AS RACISM
Now that "discrimination," "preferences," and "prejudice" have
been defined in ways that do not confuse one form of behavior with
another, we might employ that advantage to examine how behavior fre-
quently characterized as an exercise of racial preferences or racism might
not be that at all.
A. RACIAL INDICATORS
One might take the position that, while it is legitimate for doctors to
use race or ethnicity as indicators of the higher probability of certain
diseases, it is not legitimate to use race or ethnicity as indicators for
worker productivity, criminal behavior, or basketball proficiency. Other
than simply stating that it is acceptable to use race or ethnicity as an
information acquisition technique in the case of medicine and not in
other areas of life, is there really a difference? Surely race and ethnicity
are not perfect indicators of the risk of prostate cancer or hypertension,
25 Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Fact Sheet: Racial and
Ethnic Disparities in Health Status (May 14, 2002), at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/press
rel/fs0205I4b.htm.
26 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Medicine, Asian American
Medical Student Association, Did You Know?: Medical Facts on Asian Americans and Pacific
Islanders, at http://www.med.unc.edu/aamsa/dyk.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
27 Diabetes Foundation of Mississippi, Inc., High Risk Groups-Native Americans, at
http://www.msdiabetes.org/nativeamericans.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2003).
28 University of Maryland Medicine, Urological Disorders, Prostate Cancer, at http://
2g.isg.syssrc.comlurolology-info/proscan.htm (last updated May 16, 2003).
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and neither are they perfect indicators of SAT scores, criminal behavior,
or athletic proficiency. However, there are concrete factual data that
surely indicate such associations. For example, in 2002 the average
black score on the combined math and verbal sections of the SAT test
was 857; the average white score was 17 percent higher at 1060.29
While blacks comprise 13 percent of the population, they are 80 percent
of professional basketball players and 65 percent of professional football
players. 30 More than 95 percent of the best times in sprinting are held by
blacks whose ancestry traces back to West Africa.31 Between the years
1976 and 2000, blacks, who account for 13 percent of the general popu-
lation, comprised 51.5 percent of all homicide offenders, while 46.4 per-
cent were white. 32
Using race as an indicator does not necessarily tell us anything
about the decision-maker's racial preferences. The case of Bryan Greene
illustrates this point. The Washington Lawyers' Committee filed a law-
suit in April 2001 on behalf of Greene, a black man, against Your Way
Taxicab Company for violations of the District of Columbia's Human
Rights Act and of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits discrimination in
the making of contracts. 33 As Mr. Greene approached a hotel entrance,
the doorman was helping a passenger out of a Your Way Taxicab. 34 The
doorman saw Mr. Greene approaching and tried to hold the cab for
him. 35 However, the driver drove away after seeing that Mr. Greene was
black.36 After mediation, the parties reached an out-of-court settle-
ment.37 In a number of cities there have been complaints by blacks of
similar behavior by taxicab drivers. The question we might ask is, are
the drivers' decisions based upon racial preferences or might they fear
being asked to go into a neighborhood where there is a high probability
of being robbed, assaulted, or murdered? By simply knowing that a
driver refused a black passenger we cannot make an unambiguous state-
29 The Expanding Racial Scoring Gap Between Black and White SAT Test Takers, 37
THE J. OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. 15 (Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://jbhe.com/latest/37-
b&wsat.html (Oct. 31, 2001).
30 JON ENTINE, TABOO: WHY BLACK ATHLETES DOMINATE SPORTS AND WHY WE'RE
AFRAID TO TALK ABOUT IT 19 (2000).
31 Id. at 31.
32 James Alan Fox & Marianne W. Zawitz, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Homicide Trends in the United States (2002), available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/
homicide/race.htm#ovrelrace (last revised Nov. 21, 2002).
33 Taxicab Discrimination, UPDATE (Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
and Urban Affairs, Washington, D.C.), Spring 2003, at 6, available at http://www.washlaw.
org/news/update/publicaccommodationsspring2003.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2003).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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ment about whether the decision was motivated by racial preferences or
not.
Evidence that driver decisions very well might be based on criteria
other than racial preferences is seen in a 1999 story written by James
Owens entitled "Capital Cabbies Salute Race Profiling. '38 In the story,
Owens states:
If racial profiling is "racism," then the cab drivers of
Washington, D.C., they themselves mainly blacks and
Hispanics, are all for it. A District taxicab commis-
sioner, Sandra Seegars, who is black, issued a safety-ad-
vice statement urging D.C.'s 6,800 cabbies to refuse to
pick up "dangerous looking" passengers. She described
"dangerous looking" as a "young black guy. . . with
shirttail hanging down longer than his coat, baggy pants,
unlaced tennis shoes," etc. That's one typical descrip-
tion-but the cabbies know, from fear-filled experience,
about many other "looks" of black-male threat, espe-
cially at night. She also warned cabbies to stay away
from low-income black neighborhoods (which comprise
much of Washington, D.C.). Her action was triggered
by the most recent murder of a cabbie in Southeast
Washington. 39
Another example of race as an indicator is seen in the case in which
residents of Southwest Washington, D.C. filed suit in U.S. District Court
after Domino's Pizza repeatedly refused to make home deliveries in cer-
tain neighborhoods and instead made customers meet drivers at the curb-
side to pay and receive their delivery orders.4 0 The lawsuit alleged racial
discrimination by Domino's Pizza Inc., and Team Washington Inc., a
company that operates more than 50 Domino's stores. 41 According to
the plaintiffs, Domino's delivers to the door in Georgetown and other
mostly white areas of Northwest Washington. 42 The suit also alleged
that deliverymen engaged in similar delivery decisions in Southeast
Washington's Potomac Gardens, where another customer filed a bias
lawsuit.4 3 Again, the question is whether the drivers are indulging their
racial preferences or acting out of fear of assault or robbery.
38 James Owens, Capital Cabbies Salute Race Profiling (1999), at http://home.netcom.
com/-owensva/cabbie.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2003).
39 Id.
40 Bell v. Domino's Pizza, No. CIV.A.99-2376, 2000 WL 1780266, at *1 (D.D.C. 2000).
41 Peter Slevin, Domino's, U.S. Reach Accord on Deliveries, Race Can't Be a Factor in
Limiting Service, WASH. POST, June 6, 2000, at A03.
42 Id.
43 Id.
2003]
124 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13:111
According to Pizza Marketing Quarterly, similar charges of racial
discrimination were levied in St. Louis, Missouri against Papa John's
pizza delivery.44 Cathy Juengel, a Papa John's district manager in St.
Louis, said she could not and would not ask her drivers to put their lives
on the line.45 She added that the racial discrimination accusation is false,
given that 75 percent to 85 percent of the drivers in the complaining
neighborhood are black and, moreover, most of those drivers lived in the
same neighborhood to which Papa John's had denied delivery service.
46
B. PUBLIC POLICY
If one assumes that a racial preference against blacks drives a par-
ticular decision, then he is likely to call for a policy such as the one
implemented by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors. After a pizza
deliveryman was shot and killed in a San Francisco housing project,
Domino's suspended pizza deliveries in the highest crime areas of the
city. 47 In response, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors enacted an
ordinance making it illegal for Domino's (or any other fast-food deliv-
erer) to refuse to deliver in areas the company believes would put its
employees' lives in danger.48
One seriously doubts that racial preferences against blacks were the
motivating force behind Domino's delivery policy. However, the actions
taken by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors indicate that the board
reached that very conclusion. Similarly, decisions made by taxicab driv-
ers not to cruise high crime areas, or to refuse to pick up passengers that
drivers surmise are destined to high crime areas, cannot be unambigu-
ously interpreted as negative racial preferences for blacks.
There is no question that law-abiding black citizens are offended by,
and bear the cost of, taxicabs refusing them as passengers, or of delivery
drivers treating them on terms different from those afforded to white cus-
tomers. They are treated unequally through no fault of their own. But
policy should not be based on moral indignation against what is seen as
an injustice. Such an approach takes only benefits into account; the costs
should enter the calculation as well. Thus, we should confront the ques-
tion of how many pizza deliveries are worth how many injured, robbed,
or dead pizza delivery drivers. Confronting the real-world options this
way might cause policymakers to direct attention away from charges of
preferences against blacks and, instead, to the real villains-namely,
44 Stephen Rosamond, What Do You Say or Do in a Public Relations Nightmare?, PIZZA
MARKETING Q., at http://www.pmq.com/pr-nightmare.shtml (last visited Aug. 23, 2003).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See The Week in Review, SAN FRANCISCO Bus. TIMES, July 22, 1996, at http://www.
sanfrancisco.bizjournals.comlsanfrancisco/stories/1996/07/22/weekinbiz.html.
48 See id.
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those blacks who have caused the terms "black" and "high crime" to be
perceived as synonomous.
III. WHAT LAWYERS SAY
The canonical idea of "anti-discrimination" in the United States
condemns the differential treatment of otherwise similarly situated indi-
viduals on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or other protected char-
acteristics. As one legal scholar has put it, "[s]tatutes prohibiting racial
discrimination in public accommodations, employment, or the housing
market are by now reasonably uncontroversial. ' 49 However, not every-
one agrees: "Forced associations are in principle no better than legal
prohibitions against voluntary associations. ' 50 Indeed, the true test of
one's commitment to freedom of expression does not come when one
permits others the freedom to express ideas with which he agrees. The
true test comes when one permits others to express ideas he finds offen-
sive. The same test applies to one's commitment to freedom of associa-
tion, namely when he permits others to associate in ways he deems
offensive. "An antidiscrimination law is the antithesis of freedom of
contract, a principle that allows all persons to do business with whom-
ever they please for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all .... By
its nature the antidiscrimination principle is interventionist." 5'
A. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION VS. FORCED ASSOCIATION
Consider the case, as outlined in Loving v. Virginia,52 of Mildred
Loving, a Negro woman, and Richard P. Loving, a white man, Virginia
residents who traveled to Washington, D.C. in June 1958, and were mar-
ried pursuant to its laws. 53 When they subsequently returned to Virginia,
the grand jury of the Circuit Court of Caroline County indicted the Lov-
ings on charges that they violated Virginia's ban on interracial mar-
riages.54 Specifically, section 20-58 of the Virginia Code stated:
If any white person and colored person shall go out of
this State, for the purpose of being married, and with the
intention of returning, and be married out of it, and after-
wards return and reside in it, cohabiting as man and
wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59, and
49 Robert J. Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of Ra-
cial Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 76 TUL. L. REv. 11, 21 (2001).
50 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION LAWS 142 (1992).
51 id. at 3, 4.
52 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
53 Id. at 2.
54 Id. at 3.
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the marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it
has been solemnized in this State. The fact of their co-
habitation here as man and wife shall be evidence of
their marriage. 55
Section 20-59 provided: "If any white person intermarry with a
colored person, or any colored person intermarry with a white person, he
shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in the
penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years." 56
On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to violating Vir-
ginia's antimiscegenation laws and were sentenced to one year in jail.57
However, the trial judge offered to suspend the sentence for a period of
25 years, provided that the Lovings would leave the State and not return
to Virginia for 25 years. 58 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals up-
held the decision and the constitutionality of the antimiscegenation stat-
utes. 59 Ultimately, however, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the
Virginia statutes as unconstitutional. 60
Today, most Americans accept interracial marriage. According to a
1994 survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, nearly
three-quarters of Americans would not favor laws banning interracial
marriages. 6' Most Americans would probably agree that a law prohibit-
ing interracial marriage is a gross violation of freedom of contract or
association; a law mandating interracial marriage, however, would be no
less offensive to the concept of freedom of contract and association. As
Richard Epstein said, "Forced associations are in principle no better than
legal prohibitions against voluntary associations. ' 62 It would appear that
we could generalize that any prohibition against association or any man-
date to associate are equally offensive to basic human rights.
Recently, the all-male membership policy of Augusta National Golf
Club, the home of the Masters Tournament, has come under considerable
criticism. 63 Whether one approves or disapproves of the Club's decision
not to admit women as members, the more important issue is whether it
would violate civil rights if the Club were mandated to do so. In consid-
55 Id. at 4.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 3.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 3.
60 Id. at 12.
61 The National Opinion Research Center, 1972-1974 General Social Survey Cumulative
File, at http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu:7502/GSS/Doc/gssOO8.html#racmar (last visited Aug.
24, 2003).
62 EPSTEIN, supra note 50, at 142.
63 USA Today.corn, Golf: Masters Controversy Timeline (Apr. 8, 2003), at http://www.
usatoday.com/sports/golf/masters/2003-04-08-augusta-timelinex.htm.
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ering this question, it would seem that an answer to a very simple ques-
tion would help us: does a person have a property right entitling them to
do business with an unwilling buyer or seller? It would appear that the
answer is clearly that there is no such right. The essence of a property
right is the unrestricted liberty to decide with whom you shall share, or
exclude from, those things or activities that are deemed yours. Clearly,
those who are offended by the Augusta National Golf Club's sexually
discriminatory practices are free to exercise their own property rights by
refusing to do business with the club or its membership and to use their
free speech rights to try to persuade others to do the same. That is con-
sistent with basic civil rights. 64 However, by using the coercive powers
of the state to forcibly deprive the Club of its right to exclude whomever
it chooses to exclude, for whatever reason, we descend closer to the total-
itarian state.
B. RACIAL SEGREGATION
Related to issues of association is the term racial segregation. The
legal literature is steeped with ambiguous usage of racial segregation.
For instance, Yale University professor Robert A. Burt has stated:
Residential segregation was the dominant instrument for
regulating social interactions between blacks and whites
in the North. Segregated schools, for instance, were the
norm in both North and South, but whereas Southern
school segregation involved busing white and black stu-
dents from their adjacent homes to separate, racially des-
ignated schools, Northern school segregation was
accomplished by assigning students to schools within
their own racially segregated neighborhoods. 65
Michelle Adams has stated that "[t]riggered by 'systematic avoid-
ance' of interracial contact, white migration from urban public schools is
a perceptible phenomenon, and public schools in metropolitan areas are
increasingly becoming racially segregated."'66 Elizabeth S. Anderson has
opined that
[s]egregation is therefore a proper target of direct
remediation, whether it is de facto or de jure, whether
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (2002).
65 Robert A. Burt, Liberals' Labors Lost, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 55, availa-
ble at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2003/storyburtjanfeb2OO3.html
(last visited July 26, 2003).
66 Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative Ac-
tion, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1143 (2002) (citing Charles T. Clotfelder, Are Schools Still Flee-
ing? Racial Patterns and Enrollment Shifts in Urban Public Schools, 1987-1996, 20 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS& MGMT. 199, 217 (2001)).
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caused by prior illegal discrimination or not.... Racial
segregation in the institutions of American civil society
operates at three main levels: residential, educational,
and occupational. Residential segregation is the norm for
most African Americans. According to a study based on
1980 census results, in the thirty metropolitan areas con-
taining a majority of all blacks in the United States,
sixty-eight percent of blacks would have to move to
achieve a uniform racial composition across the metro-
politan area. 67
Finally, in discussing Delaware's Neighborhood Schools Act, Le-
land Ware has said that
[t]he Neighborhood Schools Act is an unlawful obstacle
to the goal of equal educational opportunities. It will re-
inforce racial and economic isolation by disregarding the
effects of residential segregation. Proponents of neigh-
borhood schools did not consider the legacy of racial
segregation that is reflected in current residential pat-
terns. They erroneously assumed that families have ex-
ercised a choice in deciding where they reside and,
therefore, a choice as to which schools their children will
attend.68
The way the term segregation is used in these statements is quite
common but nonetheless confusing, and thus gives rise to "fuzzy think-
ing." Consider the following hypothetical. Blacks comprise about 65
percent of the Washington, D.C. population. Reagan National Airport
serves the Washington, D.C. area and, like every airport, it has water
fountains. At no time have I seen anything close to blacks being 65
percent of water fountain users. It is a wild guess, but suppose that at
most five or ten percent of the users are black. To the extent that this
observation approximates reality, would anyone move to declare that
Reagan National Airport water fountains are racially segregated? Casual
observation of ice hockey games would suggest that the percentage of
black spectators is by no means proportional to their numbers in the gen-
eral population; a similar observation can be made about opera attendees,
dressage performances, and wine tastings. The population statistics of
states such as Maine, Montana, and Vermont show that not even one
67 Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1195, 1197, 1199 (2002).
68 Leland Ware, Redlining Learners: Delaware's Neighborhood Schools Act, DEL. LAW.,
Fall 2002, at 19.
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percent of these states' populations is black.69 On the other hand, in
states such as Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, blacks are over-
represented. 70 Would anyone use racial segregation to account for these
observations?
It is not analytically useful to assert that an activity is racially segre-
gated, at least in the ordinary usage of the term, based on the fact that
blacks are not proportionally represented in that activity. Using the
above hypothetical as an example, it seems that a more useful test to
determine whether an activity, such as using water fountains, is racially
segregated is to determine whether a black person is free to drink at any
water foundation he chooses. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the
water fountains are not segregated, which is true even if a black person
never uses the water fountains. The identical test applies to the question
of school segregation. If a black student lives within a particular school
district, is he free to attend that district's school? If he can, then the
school is not segregated, even if not a single black student attends that
school. The same test would be useful in determining whether ice
hockey games, operas, wine tastings, housing, and other activities are
racially segregated.
Of course, the United States does have a history that includes racial
segregation. In the past, the use of water fountains by black Americans
was often denied by law. Similarly, because of their race, blacks were
frequently prohibited by law from attending certain schools. Today,
there are no such prohibitions. When an activity is not racially mixed
today, a better term for it is racially homogeneous, which does not mean
that it is racially segregated. Surely, it would be deemed ridiculous, fool-
hardy, and a gross abuse of government power if, for example, one
where to conclude that because blacks do not use Reagan National Air-
port water fountains according to their numbers in the general population
we should order the busing of blacks from water fountains where they
are overrepresented to those where they are underrepresented. Similarly,
I doubt whether one would propose compelling blacks to move from
Georgia to Montana, and whites to move from Montana to Georgia, until
there was some sort of preconceived notion of what constitutes racial
integration across states.
IV. GOVERNMENT-SUBSIDIZED PREFERENCE INDULGENCE
People do have racial preferences, but there is no evidence to sug-
gest that they will indulge those preferences at any cost. However, pub-
lic policy can lower the cost of preference indulgence, thereby giving
69 U.S. Census Bureau, State Population Estimates: Characteristics, at http://eire.census.
gov/popest/data/states/ST-EST2002-ASRO-04.php (last revised Sept. 17, 2003).
70 Id.
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people inducement to indulge them more. In general economic terms,
any law that fixes prices lowers the cost of preference indulgence. Let us
explore a hypothetical and then discuss some actual examples.
It is fairly safe to say that, holding all else constant, most people
would prefer filet mignon to chuck steak. While filet mignon is preferred
to chuck steak, chuck steak has no problem selling. It would be a simple
task to get more people to indulge their preferences for filet mignon and
discriminate against the consumption of chuck steak. One would only
have to fix the price of chuck steak so that it was equal to or close to the
price of filet mignon. Suppose that initially chuck steak sold for $4 per
pound and filet mignon $10 per pound. Even though chuck steak is less-
preferred, it sells because it can offer buyers a "compensating differ-
ence." That is, in effect, chuck steak offers the buyer $6, the difference
in price between it and filet mignon. Thus, it costs buyers $6 to indulge
their preferences for filet mignon.
However, if it were established by law that both filet mignon and
chuck steak sell for the same price, say $10 per pound, chuck steak could
not offer a compensating difference. The cost of indulging one's prefer-
ence for filet mignon would be zero, the difference in price. A basic
postulate of economic theory states that the lower the cost of indulging
one's preference for an object of desire, the more one can expect to see
people exercising that preference.
A. MINIMUM WAGE LAW
The Fair Labor Standards Act establishes minimum wage, overtime
pay, record-keeping, and child labor standards affecting workers in the
private sector and in federal, state, and local governments. 71 The current
minimum wage is $5.15 an hour.72 While Congress can legislate that
any employer must pay each of his employees $5.15 an hour, Congress
cannot mandate that the value of an employee's hourly output be in fact
worth $5.15.
The minimum wage discriminates against the less-preferred worker.
One component of being less-preferred has to do with worker productiv-
ity. That is, employers will view it as a losing economic proposition to
hire a worker who is so unfortunate as to have skills that allow him to
produce only $4 worth of value an hour and pay him $5.15. Another
measure of whether an employee is less-preferred from a particular em-
ployer's point of view might be the race of the employee. If an employer
is forced to pay $5.15 an hour to no matter whom he hires, and both an
equally productive white worker and a black worker show up for the job,
71 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
72 Id. at § 206.
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then there is no economic criterion for selection. Thus, the employer will
have to use non-economic criteria. One of those non-economic criteria
might be the race of the employee. If the employer prefers white work-
ers to black workers, the cost of indulging that preference, like in the
steak example above, will be zero.
The minimum wage law is one of the most effective tools in the
arsenal of racists everywhere. During South Africa's apartheid era,
white workers supported wage regulation. White unionists "argued that
in the absence of statutory minimum wages, employers found it profita-
ble to supplant highly trained (and usually highly paid) Europeans by
less efficient but cheaper non-whites. ' '73 In fact, "equal pay for equal
work" became the rallying slogan of the white labor movement. During
his visit to South Africa in 1907, Keir Hardie, a British labor leader was
met with rotten eggs, because he was said to have supported equality
between whites and Indians. 74 However, when the workers learned that
he advocated "equal pay for equal work, regardless of colour or creed,"
Hardie was allowed to speak. 75 One South African union leader la-
mented: "There is no job reservation left in the building industry, and in
the circumstances I support the rate for the job [minimum wages] as the
second best way of protecting our White artisans."'76 When Frederick
Creswell became South Africa's Minister of Labour, he introduced the
Wage Bill of 1925, stating, "If our civilization is going to subsist we look
upon it as necessary that our industries should be guided so that they
afford any men desiring to live according to the European standards
greater opportunities of doing so, and we must set our face against the
encouragement of employment merely because it is cheap and the wage
unit is low."'77 The Economic and Wage Commission of 1925 responded
to the Wage Bill, stating:
While definite exclusion of the Natives from the more
remunerative fields of employment by law was not urged
upon us, the same result would follow a certain use of
the powers of the Wage Board under the Wage Act of
1925, or of other wage-fixing legislation. The method
would be to fix a minimum rate for an occupation or
craft so high that no Native would be likely to be em-
ployed. Even the exceptional Native whose efficiency
would justify his employment at the high rate, would be
73 G. V. DOXEY, THE INDUSTRIAL COLOUR BAR IN SOUTH AFRICA 112 (1961).
74 EDWARD Roux, TIME LONGER THAN ROPE: A HISTORY OF THE BLACK MAN'S STRUG-
GLE FOR FREEDOM IN SOUTH AFRICA 125 (1964).
75 Id.
76 G.M.E. LEISTNER & W.J. BREYTENBACH, THE BLACK WORKER OF SOUTH AFRICA 28
(1975).
77 DOXEY, supra note 73, at 155.
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excluded by the pressure of public- opinion, which makes
it difficult to retain a Native in an employment mainly
reserved for Europeans. 78
Sheila T. van der Horst's findings tend to support the Commission's
conclusions:
Neither the Industrial Conciliation Act nor the Wage Act
permits differential rates to be laid down on the ground
of race. Consequently, where Non-Europeans, in prac-
tice principally the Cape Coloured, are employed as arti-
sans they are subject to the same statutory minimum
rates as Europeans. Wage legislation of this type has
tended to restrict the openings for the less capable work-
men and particularly for Non-Europeans as they are pre-
vented from offsetting lack of skill by accepting lower
wage rates.79
In the 1930s, white workers approved of the Wage Board's efforts
to extend statutory minimum wages to nonwhites. 80 Boydell, the Labour
Party Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, complained that "whites were
being ousted from jobs by 'unfair competition', particularly by the Indi-
ans in Natal."' 81 Boydell urged that employers be forced to pay Indians
the same wages they pay whites. 82
Identical discriminatory forces were at work in the United States. In
1909, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen called a strike against the
Georgia Railroad. 83 One of their demands called for the complete elimi-
nation of blacks from the railroad.84 Instead of elimination, the arbitra-
tion board decided that black firemen, hostlers, and hostlers' helpers
should be paid wages equal to the wages of white men doing the same
job.85 The white unionists were delighted with the decision, stating, "If
this course is followed by the company and the incentive for employing
Negroes thus removed, the strike will not have been in vain."'86
The power of wage regulation to promote racially discriminatory
ends is also seen in the famous Washington agreement between the
78 Id. at 155-56.
79 SHEILA T. VAN DER HORST, Labor, in HANDBOOK ON RACE RELATIONS IN SouTH AF-
RICA 133-34 (Ellen Hellman ed., 1975).
80 MERLE LIPTON, CAPITALISM AND APARTHEID: SOUTH AFRICA, 1910-84 189 (1985).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 STERLING D. SPERO & ABRAM HARRIS, THE BLACK WORKER 289 (1931).
84 Id. at 290.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 290-91.
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Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen and the Southern Railroad Associa-
tion, signed in Washington, D. C. in January 1910:
No larger percentage of Negro trainmen or yardmen will
be employed on any division or in any yard than was
employed on January 1, 1910. If on any roads this per-
centage is now larger than on January 1, 1910, this
agreement does not contemplate the discharge of any
Negroes to be replaced by whites; but as vacancies are
filled or new men employed, whites are to be taken on
until the percentage of January first is again reached. 87
That part of the Washington agreement was followed by:
Negroes are not to be employed as baggagemen, flag-
men or yard foremen, but in any case in which they are
now so employed, they are not to be discharged to make
places for whites, but when the positions they occupy
become vacant, whites shall be employed in their
places.88
The Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, like their union brothers in
South Africa, recognized that "where no differences in the rates of pay
between white and colored employees exists, the restrictions as to per-
centage of Negroes to be employed does not apply. ' 89 This section of
the Washington agreement reaches the same conclusion reached by
South Africa's Mine Workers' Union in 1919, when it declared:
The real point on that is that whites have ousted by col-
oured labour. . . .It is now a question of cheap labour
versus what is called "dear labour", and we consider we
will have to ask the commission to use the word "col-
our" in the absence of a minimum wage, but when that
[minimum wage] is introduced we believe that most of
the difficulties in regard to the coloured question will
automatically drop out.90
Both the U. S. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen and the South
African Mine Workers Union recognized the power of wage regulations
as a means to accomplish racist goals. They both realized that setting a
floor on wages could be more effective and politically more viable than
the imposition of quotas and color bars. This is due, in part, to the fact
87 Id. at 293.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 FREDERICK A. JOHNSTONE, CLASS, RACE AND GOLD: A STUDY OF CLASS RELATIONS
AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 158 (1976).
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that such wage regulations are seldom seen as racially discriminatory,
and are therefore more politically acceptable among decent people (even
among those victimized by it) and less susceptible to constitutional
challenge.
B. SUPER MINIMUM WAGES
The Davis-Bacon Act, enacted in 1931 and still in effect today in an
amended version, mandates the payment of "prevailing" wages for the
various construction trades in all federally financed, or assisted, con-
struction contracts. 91 The Secretary of Labor sets the prevailing wage as
the union wage or higher.92 As such, the Davis-Bacon Act has the same
racial effect that minimum wages have, albeit a super-minimum wage.
The desire for the racial effect was expressed by its congressional sup-
porters. Congressman Allgood, for example, referring to a contractor
who used "bootleg" labor, stated, "That contractor has cheap colored la-
bor that he transports, and he puts them in cabins, and it is labor of that
sort that is in competition with white labor throughout the country. '93 In
support of Senator Bacon's Bill, and in response to a description of a
construction project in Bacon's district, Representative Upshaw of Geor-
gia remarked, "You will not think that a southern man is more than
human if he smiles over the fact of your reaction to the real problem you
are confronted with in any community with a superabundance or aggre-
gation of Negro labor."'94 Senator Bacon replied, "I just merely men-
tioned that fact because that was the fact in this particular case, but the
same would be true if you should bring in a lot of Mexican laborers or if
you brought in any nonunion laborers from any other state." 9-5
Congressman John J. Cochran of Missouri echoed similar senti-
ments, saying he had "received numerous complaints in recent months
about southern contractors employing low-paid colored mechanics get-
ting work and bringing the employees from the South."' 96 William
Green, president of the AFL, made clear what the union's interests were:
"Colored labor is being brought in to demoralize wage rates [in Tennes-
91 Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276a (2000) (current version at 40 U.S.C. § 3142
(2003)).
92 Id.
93 74 CONG. REC. 6407, 6513 (1931).
94 Hours of Labor and Wages on Public Works: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Labor, 69th Cong. 3 (1927) (statement of William D. Upshaw, Member, House Comm. on
Labor).
95 Id. at 4 (statement of Robert L. Bacon, Rep., N.Y.).
96 Employment of Labor on Federal Construction Work: Hearings Before the Committee
on Labor on H.R. 7995 & H.R. 9232, 71st Cong. 2-27 (1930) (statement of John J. Cochran,
Rep., N.Y.).
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see]."19 7 Ralph C. Thomas, executive director of the National Associa-
tion of Minority Contractors, lamented that a contractor has "no choice
but to hire skilled tradesmen, the majority of which are of the majority
[white]. . . . Davis-Bacon . . . closes the door on such activity in an
industry most capable of employing the largest numbers of minorities. '98
Government paperwork requirements for compliance with the Davis-Ba-
con Act also hamper small contractors. Unlike major contractors, small
contractors typically do not have attorneys and personnel with the exper-
tise necessary for paperwork compliance. This confers a competitive ad-
vantage to larger, usually unionized contractors who do have the
resources. 99
According to scholars Vedder and Gallaway, black and white con-
struction unemployment was similar prior to the enactment of the Davis-
Bacon Act. However, after the enactment of the Act, black unemploy-
ment rose relative to that of whites.' 00 Vedder and Gallaway also argue
that the period from 1930 to 1950 was a period of unprecedented, rapidly
increasing government intervention into the economy.'0 1 It was during
this period that the bulk of legislation restraining private wage setting
was enacted, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Davis-Bacon Act,
and the National Labor Relations Act.' 0 2 The Social Security Act also
played a role by "forc[ing] employers to pay a fringe benefit not previ-
ously provided."' 1 3 Vedder and Gallaway also note that it was during
this period that there was a rapid increase in the black/white unemploy-
ment ratio. 1°4
CONCLUSION
In today's America there is a broad consensus that race-based dis-
crimination in many activities is morally offensive, and in many cases
rightfully illegal, as it should be when there is taxpayer-based provision
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and social services. Even though people should be free to interact with,
or refuse to interact with, anyone in strictly private matters, there is little
evidence that race-based discrimination is widespread in modem
America. After all, there is a difference between what people can do and
what they will find it in their interest to do.
That this is the case is suggested by laws that once codified racial
discrimination in the United States and elsewhere. In the U.S. there were
antimiscegenation laws and restrictive covenants. During South Africa's
apartheid era there were job reservation laws and laws that reserved cer-
tain amenities such as theaters, restaurants, and hotels for white use only.
One of the primary implications of the existence of a law is that, in the
absence of the law, not everyone would voluntarily behave according to
the specifications of the law. If they would, there would be no need for
the law. After all, there is no law, to the writer's knowledge, that man-
dates that people shall eat or people shall not toss their weekly earnings
onto the street. While people are free to abstain from eating and free to
toss their weekly earnings onto the street, we need not worry because
most will not find it in their private interest to do so.
Those concerned about issues dealing with race might focus their
attention on those governmental activities that subsidize preference in-
dulgence. This paper has examined the minimum wage law and the Da-
vis-Bacon Act, but there are others to consider: occupational and
business licensing laws; union monopolies; rent controls; and other legal
restrictions on peaceable, voluntary exchange.
